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“By moving off of the sidelines, where we are now, and sitting at the 
table of nations that have ceded to this treaty, we can defend our 
interests, we can lead the discussions, and we would be able to influence 
those treaty bodies that develop and interpret the Law of the Sea.” 
—Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In early 2018, Nautilus Minerals’ Solwara 1 Project (Solwara 1 Project) will 
become the world’s first deep seabed mining operation to successfully extract 
valuable resources from the seafloor.2 As of today, no other successful deep 
seabed mining operation exists.3 With technologically feasible deep seabed 
mining operations on the horizon, nations will look to an international legal 
regime to govern these mining activities.4 The frontrunner and most 
internationally recognized candidate to fill that role will likely be the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS).5 
A total of 167 nations have ratified UNCLOS since 1982.6 A few of the 
ratifying nations include the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Chile, Germany, 
Mozambique, Russian Federation, Maldives, and China.7 A glaring absence 
among this extensive list is the United States of America who, despite being 
greatly involved in developing UNCLOS, has for nearly 33 years resisted the 
ratification of the convention.8 Notwithstanding bipartisan support and calls for 
 
1. PRACHI NAIK, THE LAW OF THE SEA; KEY QUOTATIONS, AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT (Jun. 27, 
2012), available at http://www.americansecurityproject.org/the-law-of-the-sea-convention-key-quotations/ (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
2. Matthew Keevil, Nautilus Targets 2018 For Undersea Mining, THE NORTHERN MINER (Apr. 15, 
2015), available at http://www.northernminer.com/news/nautilus-targets-2018-undersea-production-at-solwara/ 
1003570693/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
3. See Jort Van Wijk, Meeting the Challenges of Deep-Sea Mining, SEATECHNOLOGY MAGAZINE (last 
visited on Oct. 21, 2015), available at http://www.sea-technology.com/features/2012/0312/mining_ 
challenges.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Many challenges prevent other deep 
seabed mining operations from being successful. These challenges include fundamental physics of the 
hyperbaric cutting of rock, physics of vertical two-phase flows containing large solid particles, flow assurance 
and positioning, and control of the subsea mining tool and vertical transport system. 
4. Keevil, supra note 2; OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC 
ADMINISTRATION, SEABED MANAGEMENT (last visited Oct. 21, 2015), available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/ 
gcil_seabed_management.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
5. Koji Sekimizu, Address by Mr. Koji Sekimuzu, Secretary-General of the International Maritime 
Organization, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION (Mar. 18, 2014), available at http://www.imo.org/ 
en/MediaCentre/SecretaryGeneral/SpeechesByTheSecretaryGeneral/Pages/itlos.aspx (on file with The University of 
Pacific Law Review). 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Sunil Agarwal, Prospects of a Paradigm Shift in the American Policy Towards UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea: Potential Implications, NATIONAL MARITIME FOUNDATION 1, 6 (Apr. 15, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1866113 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the 
involvement of the U.S. in the development of UNCLOS). 
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ratification by several U.S. presidents, the lack of U.S. Senate approval has 
proven to be a significant barrier in taking the final step towards ratification.9 
As more nations join in the ratification of UNCLOS and the realization of 
deep seabed mining becomes more apparent, the U.S.’s resistance to join the 
convention will cause it to forgo “an opportunity to extend its sovereign rights 
over adjoining continental shelf.”10 Furthermore, such continued non-ratification 
by the U.S. will “simultaneously [abdicate] an opportunity [for the U.S.] to play a 
significant role in formal deliberations in the UNCLOS institutions.”11 The 
failure to ratify the convention is largely due to a “handful of ideologues” from 
the Senate who see UNCLOS as “an assault on U.S. sovereignty” and the 
misbelief that the original objections by President Reagan in 1982 have yet to be 
rectified.12 
The U.S. Senate should immediately ratify UNCLOS to extend and obtain 
international recognition of U.S. sovereignty to continental shelf resources 
through deep seabed mining. Ratifying UNCLOS will re-establish itself as a 
world leader in shaping the rule of law in the oceans.13 Part II provides a history 
of UNCLOS, including its origins and subsequent redevelopment in the early 
1990’s to address concerns regarding deep seabed mining.14 Part III summarizes 
the pertinent parts of UNCLOS and deep seabed mining.15 Part IV examines 
recent developments in deep seabed mining technology, such as the Solwara 1 
Project, and how its realization is significant to the U.S.’s current status as a non-
member to UNCLOS.16 Part V describes the U.S.’s unsuccessful attempt to 
circumvent UNCLOS and how the international landscape stands today.17 Part VI 
discusses the case for the ratification of UNCLOS and why critics’ concerns are 
antiquated and overstated.18 Part VII calls for the immediate ratification of 
UNCLOS by the U.S. Senate to strengthen U.S. sovereignty and leadership in the 
ocean’s affairs.19 
 
9. Id. at 8 (providing a basis for why the ratification of UNCLOS fails when it reaches the U.S. Senate). 
10. Id. at 12 (describing the detriments to the U.S. in its continued absence as a party to UNCLOS). 
11. See id. 
12. Raul Pedrozo, Arctic Climate Change and U.S. Accession to the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 757, 762–63 (2013) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(explaining who the opponents are of UNCLOS in the U.S. government and why they oppose its ratification). 
13. See generally Agarwal, supra note 8, at 12–14 (providing the benefits that will be realized when the 
U.S. ratifies UNCLOS); see also id. (listing the benefits of U.S. ratification of UNCLOS, such as continental 
shelf resources and influence in the development of the law of the sea). 
14. Infra Part II. 
15. Infra Part III. 
16. Infra Part IV. 
17. Infra Part V. 
18. Infra Part VI. 
19. Infra Part VII. 
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II. HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 
AND THE UNITED STATES 
A brief historical overview of the origin and evolution of the convention 
provides perspective on why UNCLOS is the appropriate legal regime for deep 
seabed mining. UNCLOS’ history also demonstrates why the proposal in this 
Comment is necessary to advance the interests of the U.S. and to help maintain 
the U.S.’s perceived role as a world leader in the development of the rule of law 
in the oceans.20 
This Part provides a historical overview of UNCLOS’ development.21 
Section II.A will discuss the Freedom of the High Seas Doctrine.22 Section II.B 
will discuss the origin and development of UNCLOS.23 Section II.C will briefly 
go over the U.S. interim regulatory framework known as the Deep Seabed Hard 
Minerals Resources Act.24 Section II.D summarizes the U.S. political support in 
favor of the ratification of UNCLOS.25 
A. Freedom of the High Seas Doctrine 
In 1608, the Freedom of the High Seas Doctrine (High Seas Doctrine) was 
created in response to the susceptibility by nations to lay claims of territorial 
ownership and sovereign control on the high seas.26 The High Seas Doctrine was 
developed by Hugo Grotius, also known as the “father of international law,” in 
recognition of his prediction that “if States began treating the high seas in the 
same way as land territory,” it may lead to “the risk of a full-blown armed 
conflict.”27 The High Seas Doctrine set forth the concept that a nation’s rights 
and jurisdiction over the oceans was limited to only a “narrow belt of sea 
surrounding a nation’s coastline.”28 
In accordance with the High Seas Doctrine, the vast remainders of the high 
seas were “proclaimed to be free to all and belonging to none.”29 The High Seas 
 
20. Pedrozo, supra note 12, at 771. The U.S. has historically been known as a world leader in the rule of 
law in the oceans. 
21. Infra Part II.A–B. 
22. Infra Part II.A. 
23. Infra Part II.B. 
24. Infra Part II.C. 
25. Infra Part II.D. 
26. See James Brosseau, Frozen in Time: A Fresh Look at the Law of the Sea and Why the United States 
Continues to Fight Against It, 42.1 S.U. L. REV. 143, 147 (2014) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (explaining the background behind the Freedom of the High Seas Doctrine). 
27. See id. (providing the impetus for the creation of the High Seas Doctrine). 
28. See UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE), ¶ 1 (last visited Oct. 27, 2015), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_ 
agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm#HistoricalPerspective (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (providing the purpose of the High Seas Doctrine). 
29. Id. 
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Doctrine became “one of the first firmly established areas of customary 
international law” in the world and prospered well into the 20th century.30 
Unfortunately, with the discovery of deep sea resources in the mid-20th century, 
nations began to lay claims outside the traditional jurisdiction set forth in the 
High Seas Doctrine.31 By 1967, the once peaceful waters brought by the High 
Seas Doctrine became turbulent due to advancements in technology, the 
realization of deep sea resources, and the “super-power rivalry” among nations.32 
B. The Birth of the Constitution of the Sea 
Global success in the exploitation of deep sea resources led a number of 
nations to lay claims of ownership over resources on and below the continental 
shelf within their respective jurisdictions.33 It was not until the early 20th century 
that nations realized a legal framework for the sea was desirable when it became 
technologically and economically feasible to extract resources like oil deposits 
from beneath the oceans.34 At the end of World War II, there was an international 
consensus to avoid future conflicts through the codification of an international 
legal doctrine regarding the seas.35 
On November 1, 1967, Arvid Pardo, Malta’s Ambassador to the United 
Nations, called for: 
[A]n effective international regime over the seabed and the ocean floor 
beyond a clearly defined national jurisdiction. It is the only alternative by 
which we can hope to avoid the escalating tension that will be inevitable 
if the present situation is allowed to continue.36 
In 1973, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was 
held in New York, sparking initial negotiations towards the creation of the legal 
regime envisioned by Mr. Pardo.37 This legal regime was to replace the High 
Seas Doctrine with a system based on the common heritage of mankind to benefit 
 
30. See Brosseau, supra note 26, at 147–48 (describing the High Seas Doctrine and its effect for nearly 
three centuries). 
31. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 28, at ¶ 1 (describing the decline of the High Seas Doctrine due to 
claims by seafaring nations for offshore resources). 
32. See id. at ¶ 16 (listing the reasons why the peace brought by the High Seas Doctrine eroded). 
33. Brosseau, supra note 26, at 148–49 (explaining the legal environment pre-UNCLOS); UNITED 
NATIONS, supra note 28, at ¶¶ 3–6. Following the U.S. President Harry S. Truman’s unilateral claim of its 
continental shelf; Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Venezuela, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and some Eastern European countries followed suit and asserted their sovereign rights over 
ocean areas off the coast of their borders. 
34. See Brosseau, supra note 26, at 148 (describing the origins of UNCLOS). 
35. See id. at 150 (describing the origins of UNCLOS). 
36. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 28, at ¶ 17. 
37. Id. at ¶¶ 18–19. 
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the international community.38 Through the collaboration of over 150 
delegations, including the U.S., and nine years of negotiations, a comprehensive 
legal structure governing ocean use was developed. 39 This legal regime was 
UNCLOS.40 During the nine years of negotiations, the U.S. was a “principal 
broker of consensus on many of the key issues”41 leading to the ultimate 
agreement for the 1982 version of UNCLOS.42 
Despite the U.S.’s substantial influence and involvement in developing 
UNCLOS,43 President Ronald Reagan declined to sign the treaty, mostly due to 
the deep seabed provisions of the treaty.44 Specifically, Part XI of UNCLOS 
addressed the ocean’s seabed that stretched beyond any nation’s jurisdiction.45 
The crux of the U.S.’s apprehension in endorsing the treaty revolved around Part 
XI’s treatment of the seabed beyond any national jurisdiction as the “common 
heritage of mankind.”46 In doing so, Part XI subjected members of the treaty to 
“international taxes and technology transfers on seabed mining ventures to 
support developing and landlocked countries,” and “established a new 
international organization to conduct its own seabed mining,” the International 
Seabed Authority (ISA).47 
President Reagan’s statement on the U.S.’s participation in the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea listed changes “necessary to correct 
 
38. Martin Harry, The Deep Seabed: The Common Heritage of Mankind or Arena for Unilateral 
Exploitation?, 40 NAVAL L. REV. 207, 210 (1992) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Mr. 
Pardo’s call for a change was to replace the Freedom of the Seas doctrine with one based on the “common 
heritage of mankind” concept. 
39. Pedrozo, supra note 12, at 759. UNCLOS was negotiated from 1973–1982 by more than 150 
delegations to balance the interests of nations to control activities off their coasts and their use of the oceans. 
40. Id. UNCLOS was negotiated from 1973–1982 by more than 150 delegations to balance the interests 
of nations to control activities off their coasts and their use of the oceans. 
41. See John Briscoe & Peter Prows, The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea Turns 27, and American 
Ratification Is Not in Sight—Still, BERK. J. INT’L L. (Nov. 5, 2008), available at http://bjil.typepad. 
com/publicist/2009/03/publicist01-briscoe-prows.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(describing the U.S. as a leader in the development of the Law of the Sea and, thanks to the U.S.’s experience 
with building the structure of the modern Law of the Sea, it was an influential party involved in the 
development of UNCLOS). 
42. Id. 
43. David D. Caron & Harry N. Scheiber, The United States and the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty, AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. (Jun. 11, 2007), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/11/issue/16/united-states-and-
1982-law-sea-treaty (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). The U.S. administrations of 
Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter all played a leading role in the negotiations of UNCLOS up until 1982. 
44. See Brosseau, supra note 26, at 150 (despite its involvement, the U.S. refused to sign the treaty due to 
problems with the deep seabed provisions of the treaty). 
45. See Briscoe & Prows, supra note 41 (identifying the concerns the U.S. had with Part XI of UNCLOS 
in 1982). 
46. See id. (identifying the concerns the U.S. had with Part XI of UNCLOS in 1982). 
47. See id.; see also INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY, ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED 
AUTHORITY (last visited Nov. 3, 2015), available at https://www.isa.org.jm/authority (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing UNCLOS and that the 1994 Agreement created the ISA as an 
autonomous international organization to organize and control activities within the seabed, ocean floor, and 
subsoil beyond the limits of any nation’s jurisdiction). 
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those unacceptable elements” of UNCLOS.48 In 1994, UNCLOS was 
renegotiated, and several influential U.S. political figures acknowledged that the 
renegotiation resolved the “unacceptable elements” noted by Reagan.49 Despite 
this, opponents of UNCLOS still believe the 1994 Agreement Relating to the 
Implementation of Part XI of the Convention (Implementation Agreement) 
remains flawed.50 Specifically, opponents are concerned with the following: the 
lack of any U.S. “veto” power over all ISA decisions, risks to U.S. economic 
interests; subjecting U.S. companies to an “unaccountable international 
bureaucracy”; and the possibility that foreign interests would dominate over U.S. 
interests.51 
C. Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act 
In 1980, the U.S. established an interim regulatory system for deep seabed 
hard mineral resource development known as the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals 
Resource Act (DSHMRA).52 The purpose of the act was “to be temporary, 
pending the entry into force of the United States of the [Law of the Sea] 
Convention including a deep seabed regime.”53 The U.S. Act asserts that: 
It is the legal opinion of the United States that exploration for and 
commercial recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed are freedoms 
of the high seas subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the interests of other 
 
48. President Ronald Reagan’s Statement on United States Participation in the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, at 1–2 (Jan. 29, 1982), available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/ 
documents/Reagan%20statement%20on%20US%20participation%20in%20the%20Third%20United%20Nation
s%20Conference%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) [hereinafter Reagan’s UNCLOS Statement]. President Reagan criticized UNCLOS and listed 
necessary changes to the treaty that: 1) will not deter development of any deep seabed mineral resources to meet 
national and world demand; 2) will assure national access to these resources by current and future qualified 
entities to enhance U.S. security of supply, to avoid monopolization of the resources by the operating arm of the 
International Authority, and to promote the economic development of the resources; 3) will provide a decision-
making role in the deep seabed regime that fairly reflects and effectively protects the political and economic 
interests and financial contributions of participating states; 4) will not allow for amendments to come into force 
without approval of the participating states, including in our case the advice and consent of the Senate; 5) will 
not set other undesirable precedents for international organizations; and 6) will be likely to receive the advice 
and consent of the Senate. In this regard, the convention should not contain provisions for the mandatory 
transfer of private technology and participation by and funding for national liberation movements. 
49. See Part II.C.; see id. at 1–2 (listing the problems with the 1982 treaty that needed to resolved before 
any ratification by the U.S.); see also THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE 
SEA: IT’S STILL A BAD IDEA (Jul. 7, 2011), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/factsheets/2011/07/un-
convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea-its-still-a-bad-idea (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
[hereinafter BAD IDEA] (providing a summary of reasons why the treaty is still a bad idea despite the 1994 
revisions). 
50. See BAD IDEA, supra note 49. 
51. Id. 
52. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401–73 (1980). 
53. Johnathan I. Chamey, U.S. Provisional Application of the 1994 Deep Seabed Agreement, 88 AM. J. 
INTL. L. 705, 710 (1994). DSHMRA was only intended to be a temporary regime. 
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states in their exercise of those and other freedoms recognized by general 
principles of international law. [emphasis added]54 
As a result of DSHMRA, the U.S. will continue to follow the High Seas 
Doctrine55 with respect to deep seabed mining activities but will continue to lack 
an international voice on deep seabed mining until Congress ratifies UNCLOS.56 
D. U.S. Political Support to Ratify UNCLOS 
In response to the previous objections of the U.S. and other states over Part 
XI, UNCLOS was revised in July 1994 by “[doing] away with the technology 
transfers, sharply limit[ing] the [international organization], and significantly 
restrict[ing] the original seabed mining taxes.”57 This was done, in large part, to 
end the impasse initiated by the U.S. and supported by other developed countries 
that opposed the original deep seabed provisions.58 President Bill Clinton signed 
the treaty after the revisions were made to Part XI.59 However, the U.S. Senate 
ultimately refused to ratify the treaty.60 
On November 27, 2001, Ambassador Sichan Siv, the U.S. Representative on 
the U.N. Economic and Social Council, provided the following statement to the 
U.N. General Assembly: 
The United States has long accepted the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea as embodying international law concerning traditional uses of the 
oceans. The United States played an important role in negotiating the 
Convention, as well as the 1994 Agreement that remedied the flaws in 
Part XI of the Convention on deep seabed mining. Because the rules of 
the Convention meet U.S. national security, economic, and 
environmental interests, I am pleased to inform you that the 
Administration of President George W. Bush supports accession of the 
United States to the Convention.61 
  
 
54. 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(12) (1980) (explaining the stance of the U.S. with regards to the treatment of 
deep seabed minerals located outside of a nation’s jurisdiction). 
55. See infra Part II.A. 
56. 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(12) (1980) (explaining the stance of the U.S. with regards to the treatment of 
deep seabed minerals located outside of a nation’s jurisdiction). 
57. See Briscoe & Prows, supra note 41, at 1 (describing the revisions of the 1994 Implementing 
Agreement to address the objections previously raised by President Reagan). 
58. Agarwal, supra note 8, at 7. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. MARJORIE A. BROWNE, THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AND U.S. POLICY, CRS BRIEF ISSUE FOR 
CONGRESS 5 (Jun. 16, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IB95010.pdf (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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On October 21, 2003, William Taft, then Legal Advisor of the U.S. State 
Department, stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: 
[C]hanges set forth in the 1994 Agreement over[came] each one of the 
objections of the United States to Part XI of the Convention and [met] 
our goal of guaranteed access by the U.S. industry to deep seabed 
minerals and on the basis of reasonable terms and conditions. [emphasis 
added].62 
In September 2004, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy issued 212 
recommendations to the President and Congress, classifying U.S. accession to 
UNCLOS as one of its “13 Critical Actions . . . [to] provide the foundation for a 
comprehensive national ocean policy.”63 
On May 15, 2007, former President George W. Bush issued a press release 
indicating his support for the ratification of the treaty because “it will secure U.S. 
sovereign rights over extensive marine areas, including the valuable natural 
resources they contain . . . it will give the United States a seat at the table when 
the rights that are vital to our interests are debated and interpreted.”64 Late in 
2007, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee followed President Bush’s 
support for the treaty by voting 17-4 in support of signing UNCLOS.65 
On May 23, 2012, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testified before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to support the ratification of UNCLOS, 
stating: 
American companies are equipped and ready to engage in deep seabed 
mining. But the United States can only take advantage of the Convention’s 
provisions that accord security of tenure to mine sites in area beyond national 
jurisdiction as a part to this treaty.66 
In June 2012 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard witness 
testimonies from six high-ranking military officials, four Admirals and two 
Generals, who supported the ratification of UNCLOS.67 These military officials 
 
62. Caron & Scheiber supra note 43, at 3. 
63. BROWNE, supra note 61, at 5. 
64. Press Release, President George W. Bush, President’s Statement on Advancing U.S. Interests in the 
World’s Oceans (May 2007), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 
2007/05/20070515-2.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
65. See generally Kevin Drawbaugh, U.S. Senate Panel Backs Law of the Sea Treaty, REUTERS (Oct. 31, 
2007), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/10/31/idUSN31335584 (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review) (reporting on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s support of UNCLOS). 
66. Hillary R. Clinton, Secretary, U.S. Dept. of St., Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and 
Ratification of the 1994 Agreement Amending Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee 1–2 (May 23, 2012). 
67. Press Release, John Kerry, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Rel., Statement on “24 Star” Military 
Witnesses Voice Strong Support for Law of the Sea Treaty (June 14, 2012), available at http://www. 
foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/24-star-military-witnesses-voice-strong-support-for-law-of-the-sea-treaty 
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pointed out major benefits, including: “solid[ifying] our global maritime 
leadership”; “protecting American prosperity”; and “reinforce[ing] our leadership 
role in shaping international maritime policy and overseeing peaceful economic 
activity on and under our world’s seas and oceans.”68 
Recently, at the United States’ Military Academy, West Point, President 
Barack Obama remarked upon UNCLOS at the commencement ceremony for the 
Class of 2014.69 President Obama urged the U.S. Senate to ratify UNCLOS to 
maintain a strong American maritime influence, referring to the maritime dispute 
in the South China Sea as an example. Furthermore, he stated “We can’t exempt 
ourselves from the rules that apply [to] everybody else,” acknowledging the odd 
position the U.S. is placed in when attempting to resolve maritime disputes 
between members of UNCLOS while the U.S. remains an outsider to the treaty.70 
Despite a number of testimonies and supportive statements by various political 
and military figures who leverage a substantial amount of influence, the U.S. has 
yet to ratify the treaty due to staunch conservative republican opposition.71 
III. CURRENT UNCLOS DEEP SEABED MINING REGIME 
Today, most nations are subject to the deep seabed mining regime controlled 
by Part XI of UNCLOS and the Implementation Agreement.72 UNCLOS grants 
the ISA the responsibility to manage and regulate all deep seabed mining 
operations of its Member States.73 The ISA’s purpose is to develop and 
implement rules and regulations that would “fill [the] gaps in the framework left 
 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (issuing a press release summarizing the various points 
made by six high ranking military officials in support of the ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention). 
68. Id. 
69. Barack Obama, President, United States, U.S. Dept. of St., Keynote Address at the United States 
Military Academy Commencement (May 28, 2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). President Obama noted that in order for American influence to 
remain strong in maritime matters, that the United States Senate must ratify the Law of the Sea Convention. 
70. Id. 
71. See generally Briscoe & Prows, supra note 41 (summarizing the U.S.’s absence due to its non-
ratification stance towards UNCLOS); Thomas Wright, Outlaw of the Sea: The Senate Republicans’ UNCLOS 
Blunder, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Aug. 7, 2012), available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/oceans/2012-
08-07/outlaw-sea (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Republican opposition began with the 
Regan administration and has continued to persevere. A group of 34 Republican senators, led by Senator Jim 
DeMint, has promised to vote against UNCLOS, which is enough to make it impossible to obtain the required 
two-thirds majority vote in the Senate to ratify UNCLOS. 
72. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review); 1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 21, 2010 [hereinafter 
Implementation Agreement] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
73. UNCLOS, supra note 72, Article 157. 
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by [UNCLOS].”74 Part XI was never intended to be a comprehensive and 
complete legal code to guide the ISA in the management and regulation of deep 
seabed mining.75 Instead, the deep seabed mining legal regime was meant to 
evolve and develop over time as the expertise and knowledge of the deep seabed 
grew.76 
Most importantly, the extraction of minerals from the seabed is subject to 
Part XI of UNCLOS and any rules and regulations adopted by the ISA.77 Article 
137(2) provides the ISA substantial authority in determining the standards and 
required practices in all aspects of deep seabed under the ISA’s jurisdiction.78 As 
of 2015, the ISA issued four regulations with respect to rules, regulations, and 
procedures regarding prospecting and exploration of marine minerals in the 
international seabed area.79 This comprehensive set of rules is collectively known 
as the “Mining Code.”80 The ISA has yet to issue any regulations on the 
exploitation of mineral resources in the deep seabed.81 
As of March 2015, the ISA prepared two consultation documents for its 
members and stakeholders.82 These two documents provided a draft framework 
for the regulation of deep seabed mineral exploitation, as well as a discussion 
paper on the financial terms of the exploitation contracts.83 
Throughout 2015, the ISA engaged with the Legal and Technical 
Commission (LTC)84 and the Council85 in developing an action plan and draft 
 
74. James Harrison, The International Seabed Authority and the Development of the Legal Regime for 
Deep Seabed Mining, U. of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper No. 2010/17 1 (May 17, 2010), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1609687 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
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75. Id. 
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77. UNCLOS, supra note 72, art. 133, 134 
78. Id. at art. 137(2); Harrison, supra note 74, at 7-8. 
79. THE MINING CODE, THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY, available at https://www.isa.org.jm/ 
mining-code/Regulations (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
80. Id. 
81. ONGOING DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATIONS ON EXPLOITATION OF MINERAL RESOURCES IN THE 
AREA, THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY (last visited Dec. 29, 2015), available at 
https://www.isa.org.jm/legal-instruments/ongoing-development-regulations-exploitation-mineral-resources-area 
[hereinafter ONGOING DEVELOPMENT] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. UNCLOS supra note 72, art. 161 and 165. The Legal and Technical Commission is composed of 15 
Member States, elected by the Council who are qualified in the areas of the exploration for and exploitation and 
processing of mineral resources, oceanology, protection of the marine environment, or economic or legal 
matters relating to ocean mining and related fields of expertise. With their expertise, the LTC will make 
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85. UNCLOS supra note 72, art. 161–62. The Council consists of 36 members of the ISA elected by the 
Assembly to act as the executive organ of the ISA. The Council has the power to establish specific policies to 
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framework for the exploitation regulations.86 Furthermore, the Council called for 
expanding the participation in the development of these regulations to a broader 
audience to include other Member States.87 The Council also directed the LTC to 
develop exploitation regulations as a priority for 2016.88 
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DEEP SEABED MINING TECHNOLOGY 
Advancements in deep seabed mining technology, primarily driven by 
Nautilus Minerals Inc., are encouraging the development and international 
recognition of the ISA’s legal framework.89 As the prominent international actor, 
Nautilus’ involvement with the ISA reinforces the role of the ISA as the 
international regulatory body ensuring that deep seabed mining activities in 
international waters are protected and legitimate.90 
This Part will introduce recent technological developments that are 
cultivating and fostering the development of the ISA’s legal framework.91 
Section IV.A will introduce Nautilus Minerals Inc., a company spearheading 
recent efforts to make deep seabed mining viable on the commercial market.92 
Section IV.B will delve into the significance and inevitability of deep seabed 
mining.93 
A. Nautilus Minerals Inc. and Commercial Mining of the Deep Seabed 
Nautilus Minerals Inc. (Nautilus), a well-known member of the international 
mining community, touted itself as “the first company to commercially explore 
the seafloor for massive sulfide systems, a potential source of high grade copper, 
gold, zinc, and silver.”94 Nautilus initially advanced the Solwara 1 Project, a deep 
seabed mining proposal in July 2008.95 The project made great strides towards 
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(last visited Dec. 28, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Large machines for Ocean 
floor mining will begin field tests in 2016, NEXTBIGFUTURE (Dec. 24, 2015), www.nextbigfuture.com/2015/12/ 
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95. David Gwyther, Environmental Impact Statement: Solwara 1 Project 1 (Sept. 2008), available at 
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reaching its goal of commencing seabed mining operations during the first 
quarter of 2018.96 
The location of the Solwara 1 Project lies within Papua New Guinea’s 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ)97 and, therefore, is not subject to UNCLOS or 
the ISA’s jurisdiction.98 Although UNCLOS and the ISA lack jurisdiction, the 
success of this project has significant implications for the future of deep seabed 
mining in the Area.99 Under UNCLOS, the Area means the seabed and ocean 
floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.100 Nautilus 
has already obtained exploration licenses from the ISA for zones in the Area.101 
In addition, the promising progress made by Nautilus in Papua New Guinea has 
been a driving force in compelling the ISA to create a legal framework to grant 
deep seabed mining leases.102 
B. Significance of the Looming Reality of Deep Seabed Mining 
The realization that deep seabed mining technology is becoming less of a 
pipedream generated considerable worldwide implications for all nations.103 For 
the past 50 years, the development of equipment and techniques to explore and 
exploit natural resources from the deep seabed has been noted as “one of the 
great challenges to science and technology.”104 Prior to the Solwara 1 Project, the 
possibility of sustainable mining operations for the commercial recovery of 
minerals was non-existent.105 Currently, most technology for the exploration and 
exploitation of the seabed has been viable only at shallow depths.106 
 
96. See generally Burgess, supra note 89 (providing an update on the advances made by the Solwara 1 
Project). 
97. UNCLOS, supra note 72, art. 55–57. The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to 
the territorial sea, subject to the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State. The coastal State has the sovereign 
rights to explore and exploit this zone for its natural resources. This zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
98. Id.; David Shukman, Deep sea mining licenses issued, BBC NEWS (Jul. 23, 2014), available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-28442640 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review); see also Gwyther, supra note 95, at 1. The seafloor massive sulfide deposits are located approximately 
50 km (26.99 nautical miles) north of Rabaul, Papua New Guinea. 
99. Id. see also UNCLOS, supra note 72, art. 1. The “Area” means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil 
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
100. Id. 
101. Jamie Smyth, Deep sea mining hopes hit by New Zealand Decision, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 22, 
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Nautilus, a business incorporated in Canada, which is a Member State of 
UNCLOS since 2003,107 is under the purview of the ISA.108 Pursuant to Article 
144 of UNCLOS and Section 5 of the Implementation Agreement, Nautilus is 
encouraged to share its deep seabed mining technology with developing Member 
States using “fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions.”109 As a 
result, Member States garner a significant technological opportunity over non-
Member States, such as the U.S.110 Although not mandatory, these provisions 
encourage cooperation between developing and developed Member States.111 
Originally, the 1982 version of UNCLOS mandated private technology 
transfers that could potentially be detrimental to a Member State’s national 
security and economic interests.112 This requirement was effectively removed in 
the Implementation Agreement in response to President Reagan’s criticism of 
UNCLOS.113 As a result, Member States need not fear mandatory technology 
transfers when facing a threat to their national security or economic interests.114 
Furthermore, the act of obtaining exploration licenses through the ISA 
further legitimizes and strengthens the legal framework being developed by the 
ISA for deep seabed mining in the Area.115 As the poster child for the first 
commercially viable deep seabed mining operation, Nautilus’s move to obtain 
exploration permits through the ISA, rather than working around the ISA, the 
confines of UNCLOS, and the Implementation Agreement, reinforces the ISA’s 
legitimacy.116 In anticipation of the Solwara 1 Project’s success in early 2018, 
Nautilus reported in their August 13, 2015 Investor Update that it began 
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exploration operations in the Solomon Island and the Clarion-Clipperton Zone 
(CCZ).117 
Based on the Solwara 1 Project, future deep seabed mining ventures operated 
by Nautilus and similar entities will likely require a large amount of investment 
capital.118 While investors may be protected due to Solwara 1’s location within a 
coastal State’s EEZ, potential investors would be deterred absent the protection 
of the ISA’s legal framework provided.119 
Lockheed Martin, a U.S. based company, has been a large proponent of 
recognizing the need for the ISA.120 In June 2012, the chairman of Lockheed 
Martin sent a letter to the U.S. Senate stating, “[Lockheed Martin] wanted to join 
the race for undersea riches, but could not assume investment risks until it was 
clear that it would have a clear legal title to its findings.”121 Lockheed Martin 
stated it is unwilling to do so absent U.S. ratification of UNCLOS.122 
Lockheed Martin also participated in a 2012 movement known as The 
American Sovereignty Campaign, which was comprised of members from the 
government and private sector.123 The campaign’s goal was to send Congress a 
message: that U.S. accession to UNCLOS would “invite economic opportunity, 
create U.S. jobs, and protect business and commercial interests at home and 
abroad.”124 Lockheed Martin is the only U.S. based holder of exploration licenses 
granted by the ISA.125 Jennifer Warren, Vice President of Lockheed Martin 
stated, “business initiatives to exploit deep seabed mineral resources will only be 
able to secure the necessary financial investments if done pursuant to the existing 
international framework,” referring to the legal structure created by the ISA and 
UNCLOS.126 
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The accomplishments and vision of the Solwara 1 Project and Nautilus’ 
future intentions to engage in deep seabed mining in the Area have two important 
implications: 1) Member States of UNCLOS will likely be the ones to benefit 
first from Nautilus’ deep seabed mining technology; and 2) without the backing 
of the ISA and its legal framework to protect deep seabed mining claims, 
investors will not risk financially supporting mining ventures that lack an ISA 
exploration and mineral exploitation license.127 
V. THE U.S. STANDS ALONE 
Legal scholars from the 1980s forewarned that the U.S.’s inability to ratify 
UNCLOS would be detrimental in the long-term.128 One of those scholars, 
Steven J. Molitor, stated, “the [U.S.’s] rejection of the Convention reflects a 
disappointing unwillingness to accept the contemporary world as one of global 
interdependence.”129 Molitor went on to state that the U.S. “can no longer attempt 
to dominate world affairs simply by imposing its views on other countries.”130 
Lastly, Molitor warned that the U.S.’s “[failure] to recognize this crucial 
geopolitical reality” would lead the U.S. “further into some form of international, 
political, economic, and social isolation with the image of an international outlaw 
or outcast.”131 
Nearly 30 years later, the U.S. continues to work outside the international 
framework of UNCLOS and, instead, enacted DSHMRA in 1980 as a temporary 
framework to govern U.S. access to deep seabed minerals.132 The U.S. approach 
relies heavily on a combination of DSHMRA, domestic law, and bilateral 
agreements with other nations.133 This approach, as Molitor cautioned in 1987, 
caused the U.S. to fall into further isolation from the rest of the world, as the 
number of UNCLOS Member States has grown over the past 33 years.134 
In the 1980s, the U.S. was a major influence in the evolution of UNCLOS.135 
At that time, the U.S. obtained a temporary multilateral agreement, known as the 
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Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Mining (Provisional 
Understanding), with Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.136 The purpose of the 
Provisional Understanding was to resolve potential deep seabed mining claims in 
the Area, with primary focus on the CCZ and the northeast Pacific Ocean.137 The 
eight developed countries of the Provisional Understanding seemingly “desired 
an agreement that would minimize bureaucratic interference by Third World 
countries hoping to share the profits.”138 
In response to the Provisional Understanding, the UNCLOS Preparatory 
Commission was “deeply concerned that some States have undertaken certain 
actions which undermine the Convention.”139 The declaration by the Preparatory 
Commission rejected any regime that was “incompatible with [UNCLOS] and its 
related resolutions shall not be recognized” [emphasis added].140 In addition, the 
Preparatory Commission deemed the Provisional Understanding “wholly illegal” 
and rejected any recognition of it or any claims made by any party to it.141 It soon 
became apparent that this approach had significant shortcomings, and by the 
1990’s every U.N. member but the U.S. ratified UNCLOS.142 
Today, the number of industrialized and developing nations acceded to 
UNCLOS has grown to 167.143 As the U.S. continues its isolationist attitude, its 
influence as a world leader in shaping the law of the oceans continues to diminish 
and leaves American companies at a competitive disadvantage compared to those 
who are members of UNCLOS.144 
VI. TO ACCEDE OR NOT TO ACCEDE? 
Opponents of UNCLOS believe that the U.S. may continue to conduct 
mining activities in the Area, and that U.S. interests are better served by not 
acceding to the treaty.145 Critics also state that Implementation Agreement never 
really fixed Reagan’s list of “unacceptable elements” of UNCLOS.146 
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The Heritage Foundation (Heritage), an American conservative think tank, 
has been a highly influential and stalwart opponent of UNCLOS since the days of 
the Reagan administration.147 Heritage significantly influenced the Reagan 
Administration through its 1981 publication “Mandate for Leadership.”148 Nearly 
two-thirds of Heritage’s 2,000 proposals were implemented or initiated by the 
end of Reagan’s first year in office.149 Heritage’s partnership with Reagan and its 
influence over his presidency was evidenced by statements made by both sides.150 
At a dinner in December 1989, Reagan stated, “Heritage was a ‘vital force’ in 
Washington during his Administration.”151 In a June 2004 article written by 
Heritage, Heritage reported, “Ronald Reagan was one of the best friends The 
Heritage Foundation ever had. We will miss him.”152 Addressing the issues and 
flaws identified by Heritage would be a crucial starting point in swaying opinion 
towards U.S. accession to UNCLOS.153 
Heritage argues that the U.S. has much to lose in joining UNCLOS.154 First, 
Heritage claims the U.S. would be under the authority of “another unaccountable 
international bureaucracy” involving nothing but anti-U.S. interests like the 
proceedings at the U.N. General Assembly.155 Secondly, Heritage purports that 
the U.S. would have to transfer a “significant portion of any such royalties to the 
ISA . . . to the so-called developing world, including corrupt and despotic 
regimes.”156 Thirdly, Heritage believes U.S. economic interests are at risk.157 
These risks include conflicting economic interests between the U.S. and 
developing states and deterrence of U.S. companies from engaging in mining 
activities because of UNCLOS’ encouragement of technology transfers.158 Lastly, 
that while Implementation Agreement improved many portions of the treaty, it 
still failed to secure “veto” power for the U.S. over ISA decisions.159 
Although the concerns raised by Heritage are stated with the best intentions 
to preserve and protect U.S. interests, these antiquated apprehensions are relics 
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left over from the Reagan Administration and have an adverse effect on U.S. 
interests.160 The following sections, taken together, minimize and dispel the 
trepidations raised by opponents of UNCLOS.161 Although the concerns by 
opponents were well-founded, the growing international recognition and support 
of the treaty over the past 30 years by both developed and developing nations is a 
noteworthy indicator of how the Area will be regulated and governed.162 
Opponents must face the reality that domestic political support for UNCLOS 
existed since the treaty’s inception, and only a small minority is holding back the 
U.S.’s interests.163 
This Part will discuss three reasons why the U.S. should accede to 
UNCLOS.164 Section VI.A provides a discussion on how accession to the treaty 
will help the U.S. reclaim its former influence as a world leader in ocean law.165 
Section VI.B explains the benefits to U.S. companies of U.S. ratification of 
UNCLOS.166 Lastly, Section VI.C discusses the consequences to the U.S. if it 
continues to remain a non-party to UNCLOS.167 
A. Reclaiming its Former Influence as a World Leader in Shaping the Laws of 
the Oceans 
Advocates against U.S. accession believe it would disadvantage U.S. 
interests and place the U.S. under the thumb of the ISA.168 The assertion that U.S. 
interests will be lost in the sea of interests of the other 167 Member States is 
misplaced.169 U.S. interests have not been represented, in part, due to its 33-year 
absence.170 The deep seabed mining framework continued to develop and gain 
popularity despite the U.S.’s absence.171 Only by acceding to UNCLOS, will the 
U.S. regain its proper place as a world leader in shaping the law of the sea while 
representing its own interests in the proper international arena—before the 
ISA.172 
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When the treaty was still gaining its sea legs, the U.S.’s influential impact 
was evident through its ability to band seven industrialized nations173 into 
forming the Provisional Understanding, an agreement that operated outside the 
ISA’s purview.174 After the ISA declared the Provisional Understanding “wholly 
illegal” under UNCLOS, all seven members of the treaty essentially abandoned 
the U.S. and ratified the treaty in the 1990’s.175 The realization that the ISA’s 
deep seabed mining was becoming increasingly appealing became a significant 
factor in the U.S. diminishing influence over matters relating to the law of the 
sea.176 
Over the years, the U.S. unsuccessfully challenged other nations’ claims 
outside of their respective EEZs.177 An ongoing example of this is China’s 
abstruse claims in the South China Sea.178 The U.S. attempted to admonish 
China’s South China Sea claims by “[insisting] that China must base its [South 
China Sea] claims solely on the 1982 UNCLOS although the U.S. itself has not 
ratified it.”179 The U.S.’s stance on the South China Sea debate is fully supported 
by UNCLOS, although the U.S.’s challenges are empty without its accession.180 
A more recent example involves the U.S.’s claims made in the Arctic.181 
As of 2015, the U.S. assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council through 
2017.182 The challenge the U.S. faces is its inability to evaluate other nations’ 
ECS183 claims in the Arctic, as well as filing its own ECS claims.184 Currently, all 
of the Arctic Council’s Member States and its 12 observer States are parties to 
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UNCLOS, except the U.S.185 Furthermore, it is apparent that activities being 
discussed within the Arctic Council will be guided by the provisions of 
UNCLOS.186 
By ratifying the treaty, the U.S. will not instantaneously regain its former 
influence, but it will be a huge step in the right direction compared to its static 
approach for the past three decades.187 Upon ratification, the U.S. will first regain 
its seat on the ISA’s Council.188 In addition, the U.S. will gain “important veto 
rights over distribution of any future revenues from deep seabed exploitation to 
national liberation groups.”189 
Not only will the U.S. regain a seat on the ISA’s Council, but also it will 
have the ability to participate in the elections of judges for the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,190 members of the Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf (CLCS),191 and other arms of the ISA.192 This is a critical 
opportunity for the U.S. to place its own representatives in key areas of the ISA 
to help restore U.S. presence in vital matters concerning the Area.193 
Furthermore, by reasserting itself as an authoritative component in the ISA, the 
U.S. will be better able to sway other nations in the issuing of decisions by the 
ISA.194 By taking this route versus obtaining a “veto” power over all ISA 
decisions, the U.S. will be more respected by Member States rather than being 
seen as a haughty and stubborn Western power as characterized by Molitor.195 
The fear that U.S. interests will be dominated by the interests of other 
Member States is overstated by critics of UNCLOS.196 U.S. accession will be a 
landmark event in UNCLOS’ history and will make waves throughout the 
international community.197 The reemergence of the U.S. will make a 
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considerable impression and will only grow over time.198 Former U.S. Army 
General and the 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Martin Dempsey, 
stated the impact best when he said “We have the world’s largest and most 
capable Navy, the world’s largest economy and the largest Exclusive Economic 
Zone. We will become the leader within the Convention as soon as we enter it, 
and that’s never been more important” [emphasis added].199 To properly reassert 
itself as an influential player, relevant leader, and active participant in the affairs 
of the oceans, the U.S. must accede to UNCLOS.200 
B. Propelling U.S. Companies Back into the Game 
Contrary to the belief that UNCLOS “discourage[s] U.S. companies from 
participating in such [mining] activities,” there has been a call by U.S. companies 
and business leaders to ratify the treaty as soon as possible.201 At the 2012 Forum 
on the Law of the Sea held in Washington, Jennifer Warren, Vice President of 
Lockheed Martin, expressed the company’s high interest in deep seabed 
exploration and continued support of UNCLOS.202 Warren declared, “[r]ecent 
developments in deep seabed resources have really sharpened our interest in 
seeing the law of the Sea ratified as soon as possible.”203 
Lockheed Martin currently benefits from UNCLOS and the ISA by acting 
through its British subsidiary.204 Despite this workaround, the company’s actions 
are symbolic of how important accession to the treaty is to the economic interests 
of the U.S.205 First, Lockheed’s workaround shows a lack of confidence in the 
current deep seabed mining regime provided by DSHMRA and the U.S.’s 
multilateral and bilateral agreements with a select group of nations.206 Second, it 
demonstrates the value U.S. companies place in security and predictability, both 
of which are provided by the ISA and UNCLOS.207 Lastly, it validates the 
significance of deep seabed resources.208 Warren’s statement summarized it best: 
The importance of these resources is well understood internationally. 
Other countries are moving forward quickly and aggressively to access 
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them. As the only U.S.-based claimant, our view is pretty 
straightforward. Business initiatives to exploit deep seabed mineral 
resources will only be able to secure the necessary financial investments 
if done pursuant to the existing international framework.209 
In addition, John Ryan, Chief Legal Officer of Level 3 Communications,210 
stated, “that any uncertainty inhibits economic growth and investment” when the 
protection of infrastructure in international waters is not guaranteed.211 While the 
rest of the world enjoys the benefits of UNCLOS and the ISA, the U.S. idly 
stands by, watching other nations like China and Russia claim prime locations for 
deep seabed mining activities.212 
Lastly, U.S. companies are not subject to the mandatory technology transfer 
requirements of Article 5 of Annex III of UNCLOS.213 As a result of 
Implementation Agreement, Section 5 of the treaty has been replaced by a set of 
general principles relating to technology transfers with a developing Member 
State.214 Furthermore, the treaty includes language to prevent technology 
transfers in the event it poses a national security risk to the U.S.215 Article 302 
states: “[N]othing in this Convention shall be deemed to require a State Party, in 
the fulfillment of its obligations under this Convention, to supply information the 
disclosure of which is contrary to the essential interests of its security.”216 
Only through the ratification of UNCLOS will the U.S. be able to truly 
provide American companies with the support and competitive edge that they 
have been craving for three decades.217 Without the risk of mandatory technology 
transfers, U.S. companies have nothing to lose and much to gain from the 
stability and predictability UNCLOS provides.218 To avoid losing American jobs 
to foreign locations like the U.K., the U.S. needs to accede to UNCLOS to help 
foster a deep seabed mining industry for U.S. companies and create jobs in this 
potentially lucrative and emerging industry.219 
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C. Standing by Idly will be Detrimental to the U.S. 
As time passes by, so too will opportunities for the U.S.220 The developing 
deep seabed mining industry is slowly being recognized internationally as a 
promising source for rare earths and minerals.221 U.S. companies and their 
investors will not risk engaging in deep seabed mining operations without the 
insurance and stability provided by the ISA’s developing mining regime.222 
Regardless of the U.S.’s own deep seabed mining regime under DSHMRA, U.S. 
companies lack the confidence in the U.S.’s current mining regime and instead 
look to foreign UNCLOS Member States.223 
Since the mid 1990’s, the U.S. experienced a steady decline in its sphere of 
influence in the arena of ocean law and deep seabed resources.224 In 1982, the 
U.S. was one of the most prominent influences and contributors to UNCLOS.225 
The U.S. once wielded enough influence and authority that the drafters of 
UNCLOS addressed the original misgivings of the Reagan administration 
through the Implementation Agreement.226 But when the U.S. chose a different 
path in 1998, it inadvertently surrendered its influential voice in the rulemaking 
affairs of the world’s oceans.227 
Without its seats on the various arms of the ISA, any call for change by the 
U.S. relating to ocean affairs will fall on deaf ears.228 President Obama pointed 
out that “[I]t’s a lot harder to call on China to resolve its maritime disputes under 
the Law of the Sea Convention when the United States Senate has refused to 
ratify it.”229 Regardless of the U.S. Senate’s refusal to ratify the treaty, “top 
decision and policy makers [continue] to operate under the spirit of the law” 
provided by UNCLOS.230 The U.S. Senate must realize that despite its continued 
reservations of UNCLOS, members of political, security, and economic 
communities in the U.S. recognize the tremendous value in UNCLOS.231 
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Lockheed Martin has already sent American jobs outside the U.S. in order to 
obtain the benefits from ISA Member States.232 As 2018 approaches, the eyes of 
the world will turn its focus on Nautilus’ attempt to successfully operate the 
world’s first deep seabed mining operation.233 The success of the Solwara 1 
Project will usher in a new era of opportunity for all, excluding non-ratifying 
States like the U.S.234 The probable response by other U.S. companies would be 
to follow Lockheed Martin’s footsteps, triggering the trend of utilizing foreign 
subsidiaries to operate deep seabed mining businesses, to the detriment of the 
United States.235 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is time to take action. The U.S. can no longer afford to idly stand by and 
watch as the rest of the world takes full advantage of UNCLOS and the stability 
and predictability afforded by the ISA.236 While there may be some portions of 
UNCLOS that may not align with U.S. interests, it is not the time for the U.S. to 
shy away from the opportunity to take its seat at the ISA and restore its former 
role as a world leader in the evolution of the legal regime governing deep seabed 
mining and other ocean affairs. 
Various members of U.S. political, security, and economic communities have 
spoken, and it is time for the U.S. Senate to listen.237 By ratifying UNCLOS, the 
U.S. Senate can help secure and preserve U.S. deep seabed mining interests and 
drive the U.S. in the direction of reestablishing itself as a global leader in the 
perpetual evolution of the law of the seas.238 
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